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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #4060-83  
6 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : David Y. McManis  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: May

1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.

a. USSR

(1) The Soviet campaign to block INF deployments has intensified. The government statement on 28 May warned that Soviet countermeasures will include termination of the unilateral moratorium on further SS-20 deployments in the European USSR, deployment of "additional means" in Eastern Europe, and unspecified countermeasures against U.S. territory. In private remarks, Soviet and East German officials have stated that SS-22 and SS-23 missiles will be emplaced in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. A Hungarian diplomat has asserted that Budapest has agreed to accept Soviet missiles to counter NATO missiles in Sicily.

(2) These warnings of countermeasures have been accompanied by private Soviet assurances to West German Social Democrats that the USSR will continue to seek a compromise at the Geneva talks in order to avert INF deployment. The Soviets clearly hope to encourage sentiment in the SPD for a postponement of deployment as long as the Geneva talks continue and to intensify public reaction in Western Europe if initial deployments proceed on schedule. The Soviets

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apparently believe the SPD is sympathetic to their offer to negotiate an agreement based on equality between Soviet and UK-French medium-range nuclear forces.

b. Middle East

(1) Syria's determination to scuttle the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement is likely to lead to increased Syrian interference in Lebanese politics and to stepped-up Palestinian attacks on Israeli troops in Lebanon. If the Lebanese parliament ratifies the withdrawal accord, the Syrians probably will intensify their efforts to establish a "National Front" and a "Presidential Council" that would act as rivals to the Gemayel Government. Syrian and Palestinian moves to destabilize the government may include attempts to assassinate Gemayel and other Maronite leaders.

(2) Syrian political efforts to intimidate and subvert the Lebanese government probably will be accompanied by periodic "war scares" similar to the command and control exercise in late May. The potential for confrontation between Israeli and Syrian and Palestinian forces has been increased by the confusion in the PLO created by the Fatah mutiny against Arafat's authority. Internecine warfare within the PLO and Syrian attempts to expand their control over the organization could result in Arafat's removal or assassination. Palestinian power struggles may trigger provocative attacks on Israeli troops that would oblige the Begin government to launch reprisals against Palestinian and Syrian forces in Lebanon.

(3) The prospect of expanding violence and greater Israeli casualties may force Begin to order a withdrawal to the 45-kilometer security zone in southern Lebanon. Gemayel probably would respond to an Israeli pullback by increasing pressure on the U.S. and its MNF partners to deploy their forces to the Shuf area.

c. Poland

(1) There is some chance that the Pope's visit will stimulate large anti-regime demonstrations or provide opportunities for

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
provocations by hardline elements in the Polish establishment, perhaps with encouragement by factions in Moscow. The papal visit seems to have generated renewed tensions between the hardliners and moderates loyal to Jaruzelski.

(2) The potential for surprise rests in part on possible Soviet support for attempts by pro-Moscow conservatives in the Polish party to exploit the Pope's visit to discredit Jaruzelski's efforts to establish good relations with the Church and reach an accommodation with Polish society. Two Soviet journals last month criticized alleged political "pluralism" in Poland and demanded a reassertion of orthodox principles and ideological discipline. These themes were repeated in a conservative Warsaw weekly that was created in 1981 by Stefan Olszowski, a pro-Soviet hardliner, to combat antisocialist views.

d. Central America

(1) Changes in the Salvadoran military command which have strengthened the extreme right's influence may lead to a new round of infighting that would further impair the Army's ability to cope with the insurgents' growing strength. The agrarian reform program, moreover, could be jeopardized by Defense Minister Vides' reported opposition to enforcing reforms.

(2) There have been no further indications that the Sandinistas are contemplating early military initiatives to force Honduras to end support for the Nicaraguan Democratic Force. Managua may intend to delay major decisions until it can judge the prospects for exploiting the Contadora group's mediation effort against Honduras and the U.S. In the meantime, the Sandinistas presumably believe ongoing arms deliveries from the USSR and Cuba eventually will place them in a position to force a showdown with the contras and Honduras.

  
David Y. McManis

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